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Abstract— Cloud architecture has become a valuable solution for 
different applications, such as big data analytics, due to its high-
degree of availability, scalability and strategic value. However, 
there still remain challenges in managing cloud architecture, in 
areas such as cloud security. In this paper, we exploit software-
defined networking (SDN) and blockchain technologies to secure 
cloud management platforms from a networking perspective. We 
develop a blockchain-powered SDN-enabled networking 
infrastructure in which the integration between blockchain-based 
security and autonomy management layer and multi-controller 
SDN networking layer is defined to enhance the integrity of the 
control and management messages. Furthermore, our proposed 
networking infrastructure also enables the autonomous 
bandwidth provisioning to enhance the availability of cloud 
architecture. In the simulation section, we evaluate the 
performance of our proposed blockchain-powered SDN-enabled 
networking infrastructure by considering different scenarios. 
 
Keywords— Security, Software Defined Networking (SDN), 
Blockchain, Cloud Management, Networking Infrastructure  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 “Cloud” is a vast network of remote servers around the 
globe, which are interconnected and meant to operate as a 
single ecosystem. The market penetration for cloud services 
has been increasing in recent years due to its extensive 
benefits, such as high-valued flexibility, efficiency and 
strategic value. Due to its high penetration signified by the 
benefits, cloud architecture has become a “necessity” more 
than just a “choice” nowadays. However, there still remain 
essential challenges for managing the cloud architecture, in 
areas such as cloud security that can be compromised due to 
various factors. Cloud servers, which are divided 
geographically, typically use their dedicated networking 
infrastructure. For example, Google Cloud Platform uses their 
own Fiber to inter-connect various geographically separated 
facilities. When Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) can’t 
sufficiently support their own cloud networking 
infrastructure, they may rely on a third party for networking 
services. This reliance on third-party networking services, 
whose trustworthiness cannot be guaranteed, can bring in 
additional security concerns. Various techniques have been 
proposed to enhance the security of the networking support of 
the cloud architecture. The authors in [1] proposed a 
mechanism to detect conflicting SDN related flow rules in a 
highly dynamic cloud computing environment. In [2] 
Chowhary et al. proposed a game-theoretic approach to detect 
DDOS attacks in a cloud environment by leveraging the 
programmability of SDN.  These techniques are effective in 
managing the cloud environment. However, since the critical 
state variables are stored within a controller, the sophisticated 
attacks can be launched to manipulate these variables. An 
SDN-based framework was proposed in [3] for cloud security, 
which utilizes a centralized Security Manager to detect the 
falsely injected packets. This framework is effective when the 
centralized security manager works normally. However, due 
to its centralized nature, the security manager is highly 
susceptible to single point of failure, which can result in 
compromising the entire security layer. To address these 
issues, in this paper we develop a networking infrastructure to 
improve the transparency of the networking entities and 
enhance the security of the networking service. Our proposed 
networking solution can be applied for both private and public 
clouds. Furthermore, our networking infrastructure is 
developed by exploiting SDN and blockchain technologies.  
SDN is a promising technology that removes the control 
plane from individual switches and transfer it to a centralized 
controller which possesses the topological view of the entire 
network [4]. This technology outperforms the conventional 
decentralized TCP/IP networking infrastructure by enabling 
comprehensive end-to-end controls with low-operational cost, 
having programmable hardware, and achieving automated 
decision making in network management. The rich 
southbound APIs are used to realize the network as well as 
push necessary configurations to the data plane switches. 
Therefore, in recent decades, SDN technologies have gained 
widespread popularity in different application fields [5], in 
which SDNs are used to establish the connectivity and traffic 
shaping amongst geographically separated hosts (i.e. physical 
servers) as well as logically separated tenants (i.e. virtual 
machines) in cloud architecture. In this work, we design a 
multi-controller SDN networking layer with OpenFlow 1.3 [6] 
as the southbound protocol. For simulation purposes, we have 
used Mininet, which is a Rapid Prototyping framework for 
SDN, with Ryu Controller [7]. Additionally, Ofsoftswitch13 
[8] is used as the OpenFlow switch for simulation.  
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Blockchain is an emerging technology, which can be 
considered as an immutable and decentralized digital ledger 
[9]. A blockchain is a growing list of records, called blocks, 
which are linked via cryptography. Each block mainly 
contains the hash value of the previous block, the transaction 
data, and the timestamp. Due to the inherent cryptographic 
chaining, if a malicious party tries to manipulate certain 
transaction data, it will causes the changes of the hash values 
of the block containing the transaction and those of all the 
subsequent blocks, which can be easily detected. Therefore, 
generally speaking, blockchain technology provides a very 
promising solution for integrity and security. Amongst 
various existing blockchain platforms, Ethereum and Bitcoin 
are two of the most widely adopted ones [12] [13]. Compared 
with Bitcoin, Ethereum platform provides scripting 
functionalities via smart contracts. In our proposed 
networking solution, we exploit Ethereum blockchain and 
impose security functionalities automatically via smart 
contracts. The authors would like to claim that the 
technologies presented in this paper have been include in a 
provisional patent [11]. 
The next section describes our proposed blockchain 
powered SDN-enabled networking infrastructure. Simulation 
and results are shown in Section III followed by final remarks 
and the conclusion in Section IV. 
II. OUR PROPOSED BLOCKCHAIN-POWERED SDN-BASED 
NETWORKING INFRASTRUCTURE 
The overview of our proposed blockchain-powered SDN-
enabled networking infrastructure is illustrated in Fig. 1. Our 
infrastructure mainly comprises two layers: (1) multi-
controller SDN networking layer, and (2) blockchain-based 
security and autonomy management layer. The interaction 
between these two layers are realized by connecting SDN 
controllers via a blockchain-based autonomous security 
mechanism. Overall, our networking infrastructure is 
developed to realize three main functionalities: (1) integrity 
verification for control and management commands for cloud 
platforms, (2) identification of the malicious hosts abusing 
the cloud platform, and (3) enhance the availability of the 
cloud platform via autonomous bandwidth provisioning. 
 
 
A. Multi-Controller SDN Networking Layer 
Considering the scalability issue of the conventional 
centralized SDN, in our multi-controller SDN networking 
layer, OpenFlow-enabled switches span across different 
domains in each of which there is an SDN controller. To 
realize networking, both intra-domain and inter-domain 
communication are enabled as shown in Fig. 1. Different 
domains are connected with each other in a decentralized 
manner via domain-edge switches, which forms the data 
plane back-bone network, while different controllers are 
connected with each other in the vicinity to form the 
decentralized controller plane.  
Furthermore, there are primarily two strategies for 
designing multi-controller SDN networking layer: (1) 
horizontal architecture, in which the controllers are 
interconnected in a peer-to-peer fashion, and (2) hierarchical 
architecture, in which all the controllers are connected to one 
centralized controller which is responsible for controller 
management. One major drawback of the hierarchical 
architecture is that the centralized controller is highly 
vulnerable to single point of failure. Therefore, we design our 
multi-controller SDN networking layer by adopting the 
horizontal architecture.  
B. Interaction with Blockchain-Based Security and 
Autonomy Management Layer 
1) Integrity Verification Mechanism 
In our networking infrastructure, a verification 
mechanism is designed to verify the integrity of the critical 
control and management commands for the cloud platform. 
This mechanism is realized via the interaction between the 
multi-controller SDN networking layer and the blockchain-
based security and autonomy management layer. As 
illustrated in Fig. 2, whenever an SDN controller is ready to 
send a control/management command, it generates a 
combined hash of the command data and the timestamp 
associated with the command. In our work, the combined 
hash value is calculated via MD5 message-digest algorithm 
[10]. Then the SDN controller records the hash value as a 
state variable in a smart contract in the blockchain-based 
layer. After generating and recording the hash value, the 
controller sends the control command with the timestamp to 
the targeted SDN controller (receiver). After receiving the 
command, the controller verifies the integrity of the 
command by hashing the received information, including the 
command and its associated timestamp, and checking against 
the blockchain smart contract to find out whether the 
aforementioned hash was previously generated in the system.  
 
Additionally, the receiver can store the hash values in a 
buffer if it receives various control commands from the 
controllers. To avoid interrupting the communications with 
critical latency criteria, if it is necessary, the receiver can 
directly deploy received control commands without verifying 
Fig. 1: Overview of our blockchain-powered SDN-enabled 
networking infrastructure.  Fig. 2: Illustration of our integrity verification mechanism.  
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Table II: Example of a SLA definition table. 
the integrity. In the meantime, the buffered hash values are 
verified against the hash values recorded via the state 
variables in smart contracts.  
2) Detection Mechanism for Malicious Hosts 
To prevent malicious hosts from abusing the cloud 
platform, we develop a detection mechanism that detects 
malicious hosts by identifying the authorization of the 
individual hosts. As the first step for achieving the objective, 
currently we assume that every valid host acquires an IP 
address using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
from the associated SDN controllers. Furthermore, we also 
assume that the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) has a 
knowledge of all the available MAC addresses in its 
management domain. Therefore, the CSP is able to bind an 
IP address to available MAC addresses and record the IP-
MAC association in our blockchain-based security and 
autonomy layer, which ensures the immutable exchange of 
such information within controllers. A typical IP-MAC 
association table is illustrated in Table I. 
 
 
Request
Whether the request s 
source IP-MAC association has 
been recorded in the 
blockchain layer ?
Send the request to other 
hosts in the network
Whether the response s 
source IP-MAC association has 
been recorded in the 
blockchain layer ?
Request generated from a malicious 
host(discard the request)
Response generated from a malicious 
host(discard the response)
Request-reply exchange permitted
Yes
No
No
Yes
 
 
 
When a host requests an IP via DHCP, the SDN controller 
checks whether the host’s MAC address is available in the IP-
MAC association table in the blockchain-based layer. If it is, 
the controller concludes that the authorization of the host has 
been verified and release the corresponding IP address to the 
host. At the connection establishment phase, controller will 
also check the integrity of associated ARP messages which is 
illustrated in the fig. 3. By doing so, our networking solution 
ensures that two hosts cannot establish an end-to-end IP 
association without a qualifying ARP request-reply pair.  
3) Autonomous Bandwidth Provisioning Mechanism 
In our proposed networking solution, an autonomous 
bandwidth provisioning mechanism is developed to enhance 
the availability of the cloud platform. As illustrated in Fig. 4, 
in our proposed mechanism, the immutability and scripting 
functionality of the blockchain are exploited to impose 
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) into the networking logic. 
Additionally, the scripting functionality of the blockchain 
and the metering and queue functionality of the OpenFlow 
Switch Specification are employed to realize the real-time 
awareness of the available bandwidths of each links.  
In this work, we assume that the malicious traffic flows 
are identified and discarded via our integrity verification 
mechanism and the detection mechanism for malicious hosts. 
Additionally, we consider the normal traffic flows can be 
classified into two categories: guaranteed traffic flows and 
best-effort traffic flows. This classification is automatically 
realized according to the flag segment in a SLA definition 
table. An example of SLA definition table is illustrated in 
Table II. In this table, the first row corresponds to guaranteed 
traffic that is identified by Flag 1, and the second row 
corresponds to best-effort traffic that is identified by Flag 0. 
When a provisioning request comes from a host, the Cloud 
Service Provider (CSP) imposes the associated SLA entry in 
the SLA definition table via the blockchain smart contract in 
our blockchain-based security and autonomy management 
layer. All the entries of the SLA definition table are recorded 
as structs and a mapping datatype is used to store all the 
entries in the blockchain-based layer with each data entry (of 
type struct) is mapped with an index (of type unit256). The 
entries of the SLA definition table are also updated in real-
time via the blockchain smart contract in order to reflect the 
changes in underlying networking state. 
 
 
 
 
Then the host sends a provisioning request to establish the 
end-to-end connection and the SDN controllers deploy the 
requested flow according to the mechanism illustrated in Fig. 
Host IP MAC Address 
20.0.0.1 48-2C-6A-1E-59-3D 
20.0.0.2 48-2C-6A-1E-58-AC 
20.0.0.5 48-2C-6A-1E-A1-5D 
Source IP Destination 
IP 
SLA 
Bandwidth 
Flag 
a.a.a.a b.b.b.b 1 Mbps 1 
c.c.c.c d.d.d.d 2 Mbps 1 
e.e.e.e f.f.f.f 0 Mbps 0 
Table I: Example of an IP-MAC association table. 
Fig. 4: Overflow of our autonomous bandwidth provisioning 
mechanism.  
Fig. 3: Illustration of our detection mechanism for malicious 
hosts.  
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5. If it is a best-effort service request, the SDN controller 
routes the traffic along the shortest path from source to 
destination. To achieve this automatically, one critical data-
structure, traversal edge-switch matrix, is defined via the 
blockchain smart contract. A certain entry of this matrix 
shows the corresponding edge-switch when traversing from 
one controller to another. This matrix is used to identify the 
two domain-edge switches corresponding to the domain of 
each controller that participates in the packet switching 
process for a certain source and destination. This information 
is fed to individual controller to find the local shortest paths 
of each controller. 
 
       If the request from the host is a guaranteed service 
request, the associated source SDN controller checks whether 
there is enough bandwidth available from source to 
destination for the guaranteed flow. 
 
 
 
In our proposed networking infrastructure, each port 
contains a queue to service the guaranteed traffic. There’s no 
queue defined for the best-effort traffic. Figure 6 represents 
the bandwidth allocation inside a certain link. As shown in 
Fig. 6, the guaranteed traffic has a predefined maximum 
guaranteed bandwidth. Additionally, due to its nature of 
expansion and shrinking based on the throughput, the 
networking resources can be utilized efficiently without any 
resource exhaustion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To automatically identify whether there is sufficient 
bandwidth available for the guaranteed traffic, two critical 
data-structures are defined via the blockchain smart contract: 
(1) Inter-controller link bandwidth matrix that records all the 
links connecting the SDN controllers and their available 
bandwidths, and (2) Intra-controller link bandwidth matrix 
that records the bandwidths of all the available links within 
the domain of individual controllers. These two matrices are 
used to track all the available bandwidths throughout the 
network and make decision on the bandwidth provisioning 
for a given pair of source and destination hosts. If there is 
sufficient bandwidth available, the provisioning request can 
be fulfilled successfully and the availability of the bandwidth 
is updated in the blockchain-based layer accordingly. If there 
is no sufficient bandwidth available, a decision making 
procedure is implemented on identifying an alternative 
guaranteed path. If there are no appropriate guaranteed path 
candidates available, traffic will be sent along the best-effort 
path. The data flow is automatically switched back to the 
guaranteed path when the bandwidth becomes sufficient. 
During this procedure, new provisioning requests are blocked 
to ensure that link bandwidths have been updated accurately 
before new provisioning decisions can be made. 
III. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our 
proposed blockchain-powered SDN-enabled networking 
infrastructure by considering two case studies. In Case A, we 
focus on demonstrating the performance of the verification 
mechanism in our networking infrastructure, which is 
designed to verify the integrity of the critical control and 
management commands for the cloud platform. In Case B, 
we focus on evaluating the performance of our proposed 
autonomous bandwidth provisioning mechanism.  
 
1) Case Study A 
     In this case study, we consider that the multi-SDN 
networking layer comprises of three controllers, C0, C1, and 
C2 as shown in Fig. 7. The three SDN domains associated 
with these individual controllers are connected with each 
other via domain-edge Switches S5, S10 and S11 that are used 
for inter-domain traffic. The host (h1) associated with C1 
intends to establish the communication with the host (h2) 
associated with C0. We assume that h1 and h2 do not have the 
knowledge about each other’s MAC address. Initially, h1 
floods a control command, in this case an ARP request, 
requesting the MAC address of h2 throughout all the 
Fig. 6: Illustration of bandwidth allocation inside a link for a 
guaranteed traffic.  
Fig. 7: Illustration of the topology of our multi-controller SDN-
based networking layer in Case A.  
C0 
C1 
C2 
Fig. 5: Diagram for illustrating the mechanism of our 
autonomous bandwidth provisioning method.  
h1 
h2 
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Table III: Details of the service-request traffics. 
controller domains. The ARP request is propagated to C0 and 
C2. The communication between the hosts associated with C0 
and C1 is established after h2 responds to the ARP request 
successfully. The screenshot of the terminals associated with 
the three SDN controllers are shown in Fig. 8, which presents 
the partial operations in our blockchain-based security and 
autonomy layer.  
     As shown in Fig. 8(a), When C1 sends the ARP request of 
h1 to other controllers, it also hashes the content and 
timestamp of the ARP request and records the combined hash 
value in the blockchain-based security and autonomy layer by 
uploading it as a state variable in the blockchain smart 
contract. From Fig. 8(b), we can see that, after receiving the 
ARP request, both the controllers C0 and C2 validate the 
integrity of the received command against the blockchain 
smart contract. After the cross-validation is completed 
successfully, the controller C0 replies to the request as shown 
in Fig. 8(c). The integrity of response from C0 is also verified 
at C1 using the same validation mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Case Study B 
    In this case study, we consider that the networking layer 
has depth = 2 and fan-out = 4, which is shown in Fig. 9. We 
assume that maximum link bandwidth is 9.4  Mbps. The 
queue functionality of the OpenFlow Switch Specification in 
the networking layer is applied to achieve the guaranteed 
bandwidth of 5 Mbps for each port, which enables logically 
defining a tunnel for the guaranteed traffic. Four different 
service-request traffics are considered in this simulation, 
which is detailed in Table III.  
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table III, the traffics BE 1 and BE 2 are the 
best-effort service-request traffics and the traffics Guaranteed 
1 and Guaranteed 2 are the guaranteed service-request 
traffics. We assume that these four traffic flows are selected 
for the analysis in such a way that all of them are routed via 
the same shortest path. During the simulation, there only exist 
the traffics BE 1 and BE 2 from time t = 0s to 203s. The 
traffics Guaranteed 1 and Guaranteed 2 appear beginning 
from time step t = 203s. The bandwidth occupancy is shown 
in Fig. 10.  
 
 
As shown in Fig. 10, the best-effort service-request 
traffics BE 1 and BE 2 are able to occupy the entire available 
link bandwidth until 𝑡 =  203𝑠 . The guaranteed service-
request traffics appear at 𝑡 =  203𝑠 , whose guaranteed 
bandwidths are 1.8 Mbps and 2.8 Mbps, respectively. These 
two guaranteed traffics use almost all the guaranteed 
bandwidth that is 5 Mbps. The immutability and the scripting 
functionality of the blockchain technology in our blockchain-
based layer are exploited to securely and automatically 
impose the SLAs to the network logic. For example, in this 
case study the blockchain-based layer ensures that the total 
bandwidth of the flows in the guaranteed queue should be less 
or equal to guaranteed queue maximum bandwidth. The 
metering functionality of the OpenFlow Switch Specification 
Flow SLA 
Bandwidth 
Traffic Type Identification 
Between Host 
1 and Host 5 
5.7 Mbps Best-effort 
(BE) service 
request  
BE 1 
Between Host 
2 and Host 6 
3.7 Mbps BE service 
request 
BE 2 
Between Host 
3 and Host 7 
1.8 Mbps Guaranteed 
service request 
Guaranteed 1 
Between Host 
4 and Host 8 
2.8 Mbps Guaranteed 
service request 
Guaranteed 2 
(a)  
(b)  
(c)  
Fig. 8: Screenshot of the terminals for the three controllers: (a) 
the terminal for C1 when sending ARP request, (b) the terminals 
for C0 and C2 after receiving the ARP request, and (c) the 
terminal for C0 when ARP reply is generated and the terminal of 
C1 when ARP reply is verified upon reception. 
Fig. 9: Illustration of the topology of the networking layer in 
Case B. 
Fig. 10: Accumulative bandwidth occupancies for the service-
request traffics.  
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in the networking layer is exploited to bandlimit the traffics 
Guaranteed 1 and Guaranteed 2 to 2 Mbps and 3 Mbps inside 
the guaranteed queue, respectively, which is implemented to 
prevent any potential resource exhaustion.  
The packet-loss rates for the individual traffics are shown 
in Fig. 11. From Fig. 11, we can observe during the time 
window [1𝑠, 203𝑠], the packet-loss rates for the traffics BE 1 
and BE 2 are neglectable. This is reasonable because that 
their requested bandwidths are  5.7  Mbps and 3.7  Mbps, 
respectively. The total requested bandwidth, 9.4 Mbps, is 
approximately equal to the total available link bandwidth, and 
thus these two traffics do not interfere each other. 
Additionally, we can observe significant packet-loss rate for 
BE 1 and BE 2 beginning from time 𝑡 =  203 𝑠 . This is 
because that the two guaranteed traffics, Guaranteed 1 and 
Guaranteed 2, which appear beginning from t = 204s, take up 
to 4.6 -Mbps bandwidth. Because of this the bandwidth 
available for the two best-effort traffics is reduced from 9.4 
Mbps to 5 Mbps. Furthermore, we can observe that the 
packet-loss rates of the two guaranteed traffics are very low 
throughout the simulation, which illustrate the effectiveness 
of the metering and queue functionalities of the OpenFlow 
Switch Specification in the networking layer and the 
immutability and scripting functionality provided by the 
blockchain-based security and autonomy layer.  
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have developed a blockchain-powered 
SDN-enabled networking infrastructure to enhance the 
security of the cloud management, such as integrity and 
availability. Our proposed networking infrastructure mainly 
consists of two layers: multi-controller SDN networking 
layer and blockchain-based security and autonomy layer. The 
integration of these two layers is designed to enhance the 
integrity of the control and management commands. 
Furthermore, our proposed networking infrastructure also 
enables the autonomous bandwidth provisioning to improve 
the availability of the cloud architecture. The simulation 
results in two case studies have illustrated the effectiveness 
of our proposed networking solution in enhancing the 
integrity and availability of the cloud management. In our 
ongoing work, we are developing a hardware-in-the-loop 
(HIL) testbed to further evaluate the performance of our 
work.  
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